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Abstract Science strives for coherence. For example, the findings from climate sci-
ence form a highly coherent body of knowledge that is supported bymany independent
lines of evidence: greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from human economic activities
are causing the global climate to warm and unless GHG emissions are drastically
reduced in the near future, the risks from climate change will continue to grow and
major adverse consequences will become unavoidable. People who oppose this sci-
entific body of knowledge because the implications of cutting GHG emissions—such
as regulation or increased taxation—threaten their worldview or livelihood cannot
provide an alternative view that is coherent by the standards of conventional scientific
thinking. Instead, we suggest that people who reject the fact that the Earth’s climate
is changing due to greenhouse gas emissions (or any other body of well-established
scientific knowledge) oppose whatever inconvenient finding they are confronting in
piece-meal fashion, rather than systematically, and without considering the implica-
tions of this rejection to the rest of the relevant scientific theory and findings. Hence,
claims that the globe “is cooling” can coexist with claims that the “observed warming
is natural” and that “the human influence does not matter because warming is good for
us.” Coherence between these mutually contradictory opinions can only be achieved
at a highly abstract level, namely that “something must be wrong” with the scien-
tific evidence in order to justify a political position against climate change mitigation.
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This high-level coherence accompanied by contradictory subordinate propositions is
a known attribute of conspiracist ideation, and conspiracism may be implicated when
people reject well-established scientific propositions.
Keywords Climate science denial · Consistency · Coherence · Rationality ·
Conspiratorial thinking · Conspiracy · Global warming · Coherence in science
“CO2 keeps our planet warm ….”
— Ian Plimer, Australian climate “skeptic”, Heaven & Earth, p. 411
“Temperature and CO2 are not connected.”
— Ian Plimer, Australian climate “skeptic”, Heaven & Earth, p. 278
“Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before break-
fast.”
— The White Queen, in Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found
There
1 Introduction
Over the last 150 years, climate scientists have built an increasingly clear picture of
how the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that arise from human economic activity
are changing the Earth’s climate e.g., IPCC (2013). Current atmospheric CO2 levels
are higher than at any time since at least 2.6 million years ago (Masson-Delmotte et al.
2013, Fig. 5.2), and the consensus position that global warming is happening, is human
caused, and presents a global problem is shared by more than 95% of domain experts
and more than 95% of relevant articles in the peer-reviewed literature (Anderegg et al.
2010; Cook et al. 2013, 2016; Doran and Zimmerman 2009; Oreskes 2004; Shwed
and Bearman 2010).
Nonetheless, a small but vocal group of contrarian voices exists—mainly out-
side the scientific community—that deny that greenhouse gases cause climate change
or that dismiss the risk of adverse consequences (e.g., Dunlap and McCright 2011;
Lewandowsky et al. 2013a, c). This dissent almost never finds expression in the peer-
reviewed literature (Cook et al. 2013), and when it does, the research typically does
not withstand scrutiny (Abraham et al. 2014; Benestad et al. 2015). Instead, the stag-
ing ground for climate science denial1 tends to involve internet blogs and other social
media (e.g., Jang and Hart 2015; Lewandowsky et al. 2013c).
There is strong evidence that the rejection of climate science is primarily driven
by ideological factors. Because cutting GHG emissions requires interventions—
such as regulation or increased taxation—that interfere with laissez-faire free-market
1 In current scholarly usage the term “denial” is often reserved to describe an active public denial of
scientific facts by various means, such as the use of rhetoric to create the appearance of a scientific debate
where there is none (Diethelm and McKee 2009; McKee and Diethelm 2010). We use denial as a noun that
describes a political or discursive activity but we avoid labels such as “denier” or “denialist” that categorize
people. There are people who deny scientific facts, but they are not “deniers”—they are people who choose
to engage in a particular behavior.
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economics, people whose identity and worldview centers around free markets are par-
ticularly challenged by the findings from climate science (e.g., Dunlap and McCright
2008; Dunlap and Jacques 2013; Lewandowsky et al. 2013a, c; McCright et al. 2013,
2014).
When a person’s worldview and identity, or their livelihood, are threatened by
the regulatory implications of climate change, or other environmental risks, they
frequently engage in “identity-protective cognition” (Kahan et al. 2007). Identity-
protective cognition can manifest itself in a variety of ways. Perhaps the most frequent
manifestation is that it moderates people’s risk perceptions (Kahan et al. 2007). How-
ever, the overwhelming scientific consensus about the causes and risks of climate
change—and the impetus formitigative policies it entails—poses a particular dilemma
for people whose identity is threatened by any potential interference with the free
market. A mere moderation of risk perception may be insufficient to enable identity-
protective cognition in light of the particular challenges posed by the consensus. We
suggest that the only cognitive and argumentative options open to identity-protective
cognition are either to deny the consensus or to discredit it.
1.1 The inconvenient consensus
Some groups have endeavored to deny the consensus by creating a chimerical commu-
nity of ostensibly dissenting scientists (Oreskes andConway 2010). One clear example
is the “Oregon Petition”, an internet-based collection of more than 30,000 signatories
who claim to be “scientists” but are opposing the consensus on climate change. In fact,
only a small minority of signatories claim to have a PhD in climate science, and even
among those the proportion of active researchers appears to be negligible (Anderson
2011).
Another option for contrarians is to accept the consensus (at least tacitly), but to
glorify the few contrarian scientists as heros, often by appealing to Galileo (Mann
2015), who oppose the “corrupt” mainstream scientific “establishment.” To illustrate,
an Australian organization that is dedicated to the opposition to climate science and
any mitigation policies calls itself the “Galileo Movement” (http://galileomovement.
com.au/). A frequent component of this option is to seek an alternative explanation
for the existence of the tacitly-accepted consensus. Instead of accepting the consensus
as the result of researchers independently converging on the same evidence-based
view, it can be explained via the ideation of a complex and secretive conspiracy
among researchers (Diethelm and McKee 2009; McKee and Diethelm 2010). Around
20% of U.S. residents have been found to endorse the idea that climate change “is
a hoax perpetrated by corrupt scientists who wish to spend more taxpayer money
on climate research” (Lewandowsky et al. 2013a). Likewise, many climate con-
trarian books are suffused with conspiratorial themes (Lewandowsky et al. 2015a),
and when contrarians were asked to indicate their affective responses to climate
change, the most common response was conspiratorial in nature, with people fre-
quently citing terms such as “hoax” (Smith and Leiserowitz 2012). When people’s
responses to consensus information (i.e., a statement that 97% of climate scientists
agree on the fundamentals of greenhouse gas driven climate change) are modeled
using Bayesian networks, it has been found that for the small segment of the U.S.
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public who are extremely strong supporters of free market economics, this infor-
mation activated distrust in climate scientists and ironically, led to a reduction in
acceptance of fundamental facts about the climate (Cook and Lewandowsky 2016).
The decrease in trust in response to information about expert agreement is compati-
ble with the assumption that people invoke the notion of a conspiracy to escape the
implications of the consensus. Accordingly, there is ongoing fascination on contrar-
ian blogs with the “climategate” event of 2009, which arose when climate scientists’
private emails were stolen and released on the internet. Those emails were inter-
preted as constituting evidence of scientific impropriety, and although these allegations
were eventually found to be groundless by 9 independent investigations around the
world, on contrarian blogs the rhetorical activity devoted to “climategate” more than
doubled between 2010 and 2013 (Lewandowsky 2014). One known element of con-
spiratorial thinking is its “self-sealing” quality (Bale 2007; Keeley 1999; Sunstein
and Vermeule 2009), whereby evidence against a conspiratorial belief is reinter-
preted as evidence for that belief. In the case of climategate, this self-sealing quality
becomes apparent not just through the increasing blog fascination with “climategate”
despite 9 exonerations—which represent strong evidence against any wrong-doing by
scientists—but also by U.S. Representative Sensenbrenners public branding of exon-
erations as “whitewash” (http://republicans.globalwarming.sensenbrenner.house.gov/
press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=2799).
In summary, there is growing evidence for an involvement of conspiracist ideation
in the rejection of climate science, both in public discourse and on internet blogs. This
finding is unsurprising in light of long-standing knowledge that conspiracist ideation
is also involved in the rejection of other well-established scientific propositions, such
as the link between the HIV virus and AIDS (Bogart and Thorburn 2005; Kalich-
man 2009) and denial of the safety or benefits of vaccinations (Briones et al. 2012;
Kata 2010; Zimmerman et al. 2005). However, research to date has mainly focused
on the prevalence of such beliefs and their association with attitudes towards sci-
ence (Lewandowsky et al. 2013a, c), or on examining the content of blog discourse
and establishing its conspiracist attributes in blind tests (Lewandowsky et al. 2015a).
In this article, we broaden the enquiry of conspiracist ideation to an analysis of the
(pseudo-) scientific arguments that are advanced against the scientific consensus on
climate change, and how they contrast with the positions of the scientific mainstream.
1.2 Scientific coherence vs. conspiracist incoherence
A broad stream of opinion among philosophers of science holds that coherence of
explanations or theories is a necessary or at least “conducive” criterion for truth (e.g.,
Douglas 2013; Laudan 1984; Roche 2014; Thagard 2012). Coherence here refers
to the criterion that propositions within the theory must not be contradicting each
other—for example, the Earth cannot both be round and flat, and global warming
cannot simultaneously be a serious human-caused risk and a natural fluctuation of no
concern. Although the epistemological status of coherence is contested (e.g., Glass
2007; Olsson 2005; Schubert 2012), and although even coherent theories can turn out
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to be wrong (Oreskes 1999), arguably there is little room for incoherent theories in
science.2
For the case of climate change, Thagard and Findlay (2011) showed how the main-
streamscientific position, namely thatGHGemissions fromhumaneconomic activities
are causing the Earth to warm, is coherent and accounts for the available evidence.
Their computer simulation of belief revision came to accept the scientific evidence
because itmaximized coherence among the various pieces of evidence and explanatory
propositions.
Conversely, a known attribute of conspiracist thought is that it can appear incoher-
ent by conventional evidentiary criteria. To illustrate, when people reject an official
account of an event, they may simultaneously believe in mutually contradictory
theories—e.g., that Princess Diana was murdered but also faked her own death (Wood
et al. 2012). The incoherence does notmatter to the person rejecting the official account
because it is resolved at a higher level of abstraction; there is an unshakable belief that
the official account of an event is wrong. Thus, “…the specifics of a conspiracy theory
do not matter as much as the fact that it is a conspiracy theory at all” (Wood et al. 2012,
p. 5). For the case of climate change, Thagard and Findlay (2011) showed that the con-
trarian position, exemplified by the opinion that globalwarming is a natural fluctuation,
is incoherent in comparison to the mainstream scientific position. Thagard and Findly
were nonetheless able to model why people might accept the incoherent contrarian
position by adding emotional components (such as “avoid government intervention”)
to the simulation of belief acquisition. However, the possibility that climate-contrarian
discourse is inherently incoherent has not been systematically examined. In the remain-
der of this article, we provide a preliminary analysis along those lines by analyzing 7
incoherent positions in detail, before summarizing others briefly.
1.3 Alice-in-Wonderland states of denial
Although (in-)coherence is a nuanced concept that is not readily measured (Glass
2007), for present purposes we define incoherence as the simultaneous acceptance or
simultaneous proffering of two or more explanatory propositions that cannot be all
true at the same time. For example, the proposition that Princess Diana was murdered
cannot also be true if the proposition that she has faked her own death is true. Similarly,
the quotations of Australian climate “skeptic” Ian Plimer at the outset of this article
(Plimer 2009) are incoherent. It cannot simultaneously be true that “CO2 keeps our
planet warm …” and that “Temperature and CO2 are not connected.” We next show
that this incoherence suffuses the public posture of climate science denial, suggesting
that it cannot lay a strong claim to scientific or intellectual credibility. We begin by
considering the public discourse of denial in the aggregate, where incoherence is
introduced by multiple actors, before returning to the level of incoherent statements
by single individuals.
2 The case of the incompatibility of quantummechanics and relativity is an exception, one that has provoked
much concern among both philosophers and scientists, thus proving the general point that incoherence is
undesirable.
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1.3.1 Climate sensitivity is low but it is high
One of the most important, but uncertain, variables that determines the extent of future
warming is climate sensitivity, defined as the warming that is ultimately expected in
response to a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentrations from preindustrial times
(e.g., Lewandowsky et al. 2014). If sensitivity is high, then continued emissions will
increase global temperatures more than when it is low. Low estimates of sensitivity
(e.g., ≈1.5 ◦C; Lewis and Curry 2014) are therefore favored by contrarians, with
higher values within the range of consensual IPCC estimates—between 1.5 and 4.5 ◦C
(Freeman et al. 2015)—being ignored or labeled “alarmist.”
Another popular contrarian argument is that the “climate has changed before”,
which frequently carries the tacit or explicit rhetorical implication that present-day
climate change is similarly due only to the natural factors that drove past climate
changes. This implication is a logical fallacy because the same effect can have mul-
tiple causes: Past climate changes were largely driven by slight variations in solar
intensity arising from orbital variations or solar cycles, and those events are entirely
independent of contemporary GHG-driven global warming. Moreover, the appeal to
past periods of warming also entails a commitment to high climate sensitivity: if cli-
mate sensitivity were as low as contrarians like to claim (≈1.5 ◦C), then the minute
past variation in intensity of insolation could not have caused the observed warming
episodes (PALAEOSENS 2012).
Either the climate changed in the past because it is highly sensitive to external
forces, in which case we are facing considerable future warming, or its sensitivity to
the forces triggered by increasing CO2 concentrations is low, in which case the climate
should not have changed much in the past. Except that it did.
1.3.2 CO2 cannot be measured but lags behind temperature
Past levels of atmospheric CO2 are known with considerable precision from analysis
of Antarctic ice cores dating back 400,000 years. One contrarian argument holds that
thosemeasurements are unreliable anddonot tell us about pastCO2 levels (Jaworowski
1997).
A notable aspect of past climate changes is that atmospheric CO2 increased after
an initial increase in temperatures primarily in Antarctica. This occurs because the
initial solar-driven warming that is focused on extreme latitudes is sufficient to trigger
the release of CO2 from the oceans into the atmosphere (because solubility of CO2 in
water decreases with increasing temperature), which in turn amplifies warming and
hence leads to more release of CO2 from the oceans, and so on. Overall, more than
90% of the warming observed during the glacial-interglacial followed the increase in
CO2 whereas less than 10% preceded the release of CO2 and was due to the initial
solar pulse (Shakun et al. 2012).3 By focusing on the lag between temperature increase
and CO2 increase in Antarctica, and by ignoring the fact that warming occurs after the
CO2 increase across most of the globe, contrarians have argued that CO2 was not the
3 The full picture is more nuanced and includes several other feedbacks and processes than can not be
presented here.
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cause of warming in the past but a consequence. By extension, CO2 also cannot be the
cause of warming in the present but must be a consequence of warming that is caused
by some othermeans. (Additionally, this argument relies on a false dichotomy because,
like chickens and eggs, increasing atmospheric CO2 can both be the consequence and
the cause of warming.)
Either the ice core record is sufficiently accurate to sustain arguments about the
role of CO2 in past climate changes, or it is unreliable and therefore does not
permit any argument either way. There are several additional variants of this inco-
herence: For example, some contrarians have argued that contemporary CO2 levels
cannot be measured with any degree of accuracy (Beck 2008), whereas others have
claimed that CO2 increases because of emissions from underwater volcanoes (Plimer
2010).
1.3.3 Global temperature cannot be measured accurately but global warming
stopped in 1998
A long-standing contrarian argument has been that the global temperature record is
inaccurate and that therefore global warming cannot be measured accurately (Watts
2009). This argument has often appealed to the presence of “urban heat islands”; that
is, the trapping of heat in large urban areas which has increased with greater traffic
volumes and economic activity. Alternatively, the argument cites the fact that ther-
mometers may be located near airports or air conditioner exhausts, thereby distorting
and artificially amplifying the temperature trend. Another variant of the argument
cites adjustments to the temperature record (which are necessary to compensate for
variables such as the movement or replacement of thermometers over time) as intro-
ducing a warming bias. The scientific literature has shown that those arguments have
no qualitative impact on the observed warming trend (e.g., Fall et al. 2011; Smith et al.
2005).
Another long-standing contrarian claim has been that global warming “stopped” in
1998 (e.g., Carter 2006). Although this claim is based on a questionable interpretation
of statistical data (Lewandowsky et al. 2015b, c, d), it has been a focal point of media
debate for the last decade or more and it has ultimately found entry into the scientific
literature under the label of a “pause” or “hiatus” in warming (Boykoff 2014).
Either the temperature record is sufficiently accurate to examine its evolution,
including the possibility thatwarmingmay have “paused”, or the record is so unreliable
that no determination about global temperatures can be made.4
1.3.4 There is no scientific consensus but contrarians are dissenting heroes
The pervasive scientific consensus on climate change (Anderegg et al. 2010; Cook
et al. 2013; Doran and Zimmerman 2009; Oreskes 2004; Shwed and Bearman 2010;
for a synthesis of studies quantifying the consensus on climate change, see Cook
et al. 2016) is of considerable psychological and political importance. The public’s
4 A possible escape from incoherence is to soften the claim about the data being unreliable to “the data
exaggerate warming”. Warming might indeed have stopped if the data over-estimate warming.
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perception of the consensus has been identified as a “gateway belief” van der Linden
et al. (2015) that plays an important role in influencing people’s acceptance of policy
measures. When people are informed about the broad nature of the consensus, this
often alters their attitudes towards climate change (Cook and Lewandowsky 2016;
Lewandowsky et al. 2013b; van der Linden et al. 2015).
Contrarian efforts to undermine the perception of the consensus have therefore
been considerable. For example, the top argument leveled against climate change by
syndicated conservative columnists in the U.S. between 2007 and 2010 was the claim
that there is no scientific consensus (Elsasser and Dunlap 2013). Other efforts involve
the creation of large lists of “scientists” who ostensibly deviate from the consensus,
such as the “Oregon Petition”, which claimsmore than 31,000 signatories who express
their dissent from the consensus view (Dunlap and McCright 2010; Anderson 2011).
Only a small number of signatories, however, turn out to be actual scientists with
expertise in climate change (Anderson 2011).
A parallel stream of contrarian discourse highlights the heroism of the lone contrar-
ian scientist who dissents from the “establishment” and fearlessly opposes “political
persecution and fraud” (e.g., Solomon 2008).
Either there is a pervasive scientific consensus in which case contrarians are indeed
dissenters, or there is no consensus inwhich case contrarian opinions should havebroad
support within the scientific community and no fearless opposition to an establishment
is necessary.
1.3.5 The climate cannot be predicted but we are heading into an ice age
The argument that future climate change cannot be predicted with any accuracy is
commonly expressed in the form that weather forecasters cannot predict next week’s
weather, so how can they possibly predict climate over the next century (Hickman
2010). This argument is fallacious because it conflates weather (short-term, localised
changes subject to internal variability) with climate (long-term, wide-scale regional
or global changes driven largely by external forcing). Predictions of the former are
highly sensitive to imprecision in the estimates of initial values (i.e., the current state
of weather) and hence lose skill after several days, whereas projections of the latter are
insensitive to initial values, and are instead aggregated across numerous possible initial
states to extract the long-term anthropogenic climate signal from among the natural
variability. An intuitive everyday example of this ability to project future climate is the
seasonal cycle: we can state with considerable confidence that Minnesota will always
be warmer in July than in January.
Setting aside the fallacious nature of the argument regarding weather forecasts,
contrarians have also argued that the future climate is headed towards an ice age,
most commonly attributed to decreased solar activity (Johnson 2013). This prediction
has been falsified by climate modelling that found that decreased solar activity will
have aminiscule effect compared to thewarming effect fromgreenhouse gas emissions
(Feulner andRahmstorf 2010). Setting aside falsification of the prediction, the inherent
contradiction in this pair of arguments is to argue that future climate cannot be predicted
while also predicting a future ice age (Rose 2010).
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Either we cannot know what happens in the future, in which case predictions of
an ice age are entirely fantastical, or we can in principle anticipate how the climate
will evolve in the future, in which case climate projections cannot be dismissed by a
blanket appeal to ignorance.
1.3.6 Extreme events cannot be attributed to global warming but snowfall disproves
global warming
While a growing body of research has attributed a statistical increase in extreme
weather events to global warming (Coumou et al. 2014; Min et al. 2011; Pall et al.
2011), attributing a single extremeweather event, such as a particular drought or flood,
to observed changes in climate is still a difficult exercise. Nonetheless, recent research
has increasingly attempted to attribute specific events to global warming (Hansen et al.
2012; Otto et al. 2012; Rahmstorf andCoumou 2011). In some cases, attribution can be
made with considerable confidence, for example involving the ongoingMediterranean
drought (Hoerling et al. 2012; Kelley et al. 2015). In any case, the basis of the extreme-
events analyses is that there is a possible causal link between those events and global
warming.
Those explicit attributions of extreme events are largely ignored by contrarians,
who instead focus on the—partially accurate—claim that it is problematic to attribute
single extreme events as evidence for global warming (Taylor 2011). In direct con-
tradiction to that claim, however, they also cite examples of extreme cold as evidence
against global warming (Booker 2008). In one widely reported instance, a U.S. Sen-
ator (James Inhofe, R, Oklahoma) displayed a snowball in the U.S. Senate to argue
against global warming. This argument assumes a causal link between global warming
and the (absence of) snow or cold events, thus tacitly accepting the assumptions made
in ordinary climate science. Specifically, one either admits extreme events as being
at least potentially diagnostic—in which case the snowball might conceivably serve
as “evidence” against global warming in the same way that droughts or heat records
provide evidence for global warming—or one rejects the possibility that individual
events are diagnostic because they cannot be tied to the presence (or absence) of global
warming. If one rejects the diagnosticity of events, then the argumentational use of
a snowball is incoherent with that rejection, but if the snowball is admitted then so
should be record-breaking heat events (which outnumber record cold events by at least
2-to-1 in the U.S., Meehl et al. 2009, and by 6-to-1 or more in a recent analysis of
extremes in Europe, Beniston 2015).
Either extreme events are meaningful, in which case the clear increase of some
types of event underscores the presence of climate change, or extreme events cannot
be linked to climate change, in which case snowfall or cold has no bearing on the
issue.
1.3.7 The Greenland ice sheet cannot collapse but Greenland used to be green
in Medieval times
If theGreenland ice sheet were to completelymelt, it would contribute around 7metres
to global sea level rise (Church et al. 2013). One contrarian argument is that Greenland
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is not capable of this type of catastrophic collapse (Ollier 2007), based on the premises
that Greenland’s glaciers are not melting from the surface down, and that they are not
sliding down an inclined plane lubricated by meltwater. Both of those premises are
false (Colgan et al. 2015; Phillips et al. 2013), with ice loss from Greenland in recent
years being greater than at any time since at least 1840 (Box and Colgan 2013).
At the same time, contrarians also argue that Greenland used to be green in the
times of the Vikings (Bolt 2007), implying that significant amounts of the ice sheet
was melted (while incidentally failing to acknowledge the metres of sea level rise that
would have accompanied such a degree of melt). This argument follows the same
fallacious reasoning as the common myth “past climate change disproves human role
in modern global warming.”
Either Greenland was so sensitive to temperature that it suffered a significant
collapse in pre-Medieval times, which would imply a heightened sensitivity to con-
temporary human-induced warming, or Greenland is safe from collapse in which case
it could not have been green during the Viking era.
1.3.8 Other incoherent arguments
Over one hundred incoherent pairs of arguments can be found in contrarian discourse.
(See www.skepticalscience.com/contradictions.php). In this article, we have explored
a representative sample in some detail. For further illustration we show several other
incoherent arguments in Table 1. Each of the arguments in the table is subject to the
same critical analysis as the examples in the preceding sections.
1.4 Individual cognition vs. group behavior
Our analysis was performed at the aggregate level; that is, we considered the incoher-
ence of collective argumentation among a “community” of like-minded individuals as
if it were a single intellectual entity. It is possible, therefore, that individuals within this
community would only hold one or the other of two incoherent views, and that each
person considered in isolation would not be incoherent. In that case, one could argue
that there is merely a heterogeneity of views in the “community” of denialists, which
might in turn be interpreted as being an indication of “healthy debate” or “scientific
diversity” rather than incoherence.
We reject both the possibility and its hypothetical implication.
Our introductory quotations of Ian Plimer established that the argumentative inco-
herence that we analyzed in this article also arises within arguments offered by the
same individual. Table 2 lists additional contradictory statements that, unlike those
in Table 1, were made by the same person on separate occasions. This sample is far
from exhaustive but is sufficient to establish the existence of argumentative inco-
herence at the level of the individual in addition to the denial movement in the
aggregate.
Moreover, even if incoherencewere entirely confined to being between the opinions
of different individuals, there are several reasons why this would not be reflective of
“healthy debate” or “scientific diversity”.
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Table 1 Sample of additional incoherent arguments
Argument 1 Argument 2
TREND and FACT DENIAL
Future climate cannot be predicted We are heading into an ice age
Greenhouse effect has been falsifed Water vapour is the most powerful greenhouse gas
Paleo-temperature proxies are unreliable The middle ages were warmer.
Other planets are warming It’s cooling
Global temperature does not exist It cooled mid-century
ATTRIBUTION DENIAL
Paleo-temperature proxies are unreliable The middle ages were warmer
Global warming theory is not falsifable Global warming has been falsifed
Warming causes CO2 rise There’s no correlation between CO2 and
temperature
Mars is warming Mars is colder despite all the CO2
CO2 was higher in the past CO2 measurements are suspect
CO2 was higher in the 1800s It warmed before 1940 when CO2 was low
Temperature proxies are unreliable CO2 lags temperature
Global warming is caused by waste heat Humans are too insignificant to affect global climate
Extreme events cannot be attributed to global
warming
Snowfall disproves global warming
IMPACT DENIAL
It’s not bad There’s no such thing as an ideal climate
CO2 is plant food CO2 is just a trace gas
SOLUTION and POLITICAL DENIAL
My country should not cut emissions Global warming is natural
China needs to cut emissions Global warming is unstoppable
Global warming is a socialist plot The Nazis invented global warming
First, as we noted at the outset, science strives for coherence (e.g., Douglas 2013;
Laudan 1984; Roche 2014; Thagard 2012) and there is little room for incoherent theo-
ries in science (and any incoherence contains within it an impetus for reconciliation).
The scientific consensus on climate change embodied in the IPCC reports represents
a coherent body of knowledge that draws an arc from the microscale of molecular
chemistry (viz. the heat absorbing properties of CO2) to the macroscale of a suite of
global indicators (viz. global temperatures, sea level rise, mass loss in the cryosphere,
and so on). This coherence is attained even though several thousands of scientists are
involved in production of the report as authors and reviewers. It follows that if cli-
mate denial were to constitute scientific reasoning—as is its purported purpose (e.g.,
Solomon 2008)—then it would exhibit coherence notwithstanding the presence of
multiple agents and actors. The fact that it fails to achieve this and that incoherence is
manifest at the aggregate (Table 1) as well as at the individual level (Table 2) leaves
little doubt about the non-scientific nature of denial.
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Second, the theoretical coherence of consensual climate science does not prevent
robust debate. One striking example involves the recent controversy about the so-
called “pause” or “hiatus” in global warming in the early 2000’s. Some scientists have
argued against the existence or special status of this “pause” (e.g., Cahill et al. 2015;
Foster andRahmstorf 2011; Foster andAbraham2015;Karl et al. 2015; Lewandowsky
et al. 2015c, d) whereas others have taken a contrary position (Fyfe et al. 2016; Tren-
berth 2015). We therefore argue that science achieves its coherence through a constant
self-correction process (e.g., Alberts et al. 2015; Longino 1990, 2002) that occurs
through peer-review, journal articles, conference communications, graduate training,
mentoring, and so on. Scientific debate is a key element of achieving scientific coher-
ence (Leuschner 2012). No such corrective processes can be observed in denialist
discourse which focuses entirely on its opposition to mainstream science and does
not entail any debate among the incoherent positions we have revealed in this arti-
cle.
The absence of any corrective resolution process among climate contrarians raises
the question to what extent incoherence is perceived or recognized as a problem by
people who hold contrarian views. This question is difficult to answer with any degree
of certainty, although one can attempt tomake an inference by examining the “revealed
preferences” (cf. Beshears et al. 2008) of contrarians. In the context of climate change,
one way in which preferences might be revealed is by the willingness to incur financial
risks to back one’s position in a bet. Bets have a long history as a tool to reveal people’s
preferences.
Risbey et al. (2015) analyzed the actual historical and likely future odds of a number
of different betting strategies on global temperatures from the late 19th century to
2100. Risbey et al. found that all possible 15-year bets since 1970 were won by bettors
positing continued warming, and that bets against greenhouse warming are largely
hopeless now.
It is notable that although contrarians readily claim that the Earth will be cooling
in the future, most are unwilling to bet on their stated position (Annan 2005). The
experiences of Nobel Laureate Brian Schmidt, of the Australian National University,
who offered a bet to an Australian “skeptic” (a business adviser of former Prime
Minister Tony Abbott) are illuminating in this regard (Cook 2015). The widespread
reluctance to engage in bets by contrarians suggests that their public posture differs
from their actual knowledge, and that they know that any such bet would be hopeless
(Risbey et al. 2015). The unwillingness to bet is thus indicative of the over-arching
rationality of denial, notwithstanding its argumentative incoherence and non-scientific
nature.
1.5 Rational denial
Unlike mainstream science, which is regularly summarized in the IPCC’s Assessment
Reports, contrarian positions are more diverse, and are spread across a multitude of
sources—from internet blogs, to reports produced by “think tanks” (Jacques et al.
2008), to popular books (Dunlap and Jacques 2013). Although this diversity makes
it challenging to identify the over-arching level of abstraction at which contrarian
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positions may achieve the coherence that is lacking in their (pseudo-) scientific argu-
ments, there is little doubt that the common denominator among contrarian positions
is the conviction that climate change either does not exist or is not human caused, and
that either way it does not present a risk (or if it does, then adaptation will deal with
the problem). Any mitigation efforts would thus be misplaced and add an unneces-
sary burden on the economy. In a nutshell, the opposition to GHG emission cuts is
the unifying and coherent position underlying all manifestations of climate science
denial.
Accordingly, contrarian activities are supported by the injection of considerable
funds by vested and political interests (Brulle 2013); most climate-“skeptic” books
have links to conservative think tanks (Dunlap and Jacques 2013); and fossil-fuel
interests have interfered with scientific assessments (Mooney 2007). As noted earlier,
Thagard and Findlay (2011) have shown thatwhen those political goals are represented
as strong emotional components within a rational belief system that is devoted to seek
maximal coherence, the systemwill adopt a “skeptic” position notwithstanding the fact
that it is less commensurate with the evidence than the mainstream scientific position.
Similarly, Cook and Lewandowsky (2016) have shown within a Bayesian framework
that ironic updating of beliefs—that is, becoming more entrenched in one’s position
in light of contrary evidence—can be modeled by a rational belief-updating system
under some circumstances. In Cook and Lewandowsky (2016)’s study, participants
who strongly supported free-market economics responded to climate-consensus infor-
mation by lowering their acceptance of human-caused global warming. This ironic
“backfire” effect was identified as being rational because people adjusted their trust in
climate scientists downward, thereby accommodating information about the consensus
without requiring an adjustment of belief in the science—because if scientists cannot
be trusted, then they would likely collude to create the appearance of a consensus.
If the coherent goal of contrarian activities is the prevention of political action,
then argumentative incoherence—or other manifestations of conspiracist thought—
are irrelevant, from the contrarians’ perspective, so long as it does not interfere with
achievement of that goal. There is some evidence that conspiratorial content is not
detrimental to achieving the objectives of preventing or delaying policy action. On the
contrary, it has been shown that the mere exposure to conspiracy theories involving
global warming decreases pro-environmental decision making and the intention to
reduce one’s carbon footprint (Jolley and Douglas 2013; van der Linden 2015). Simi-
larly, McCright et al. (2016) and Ranney and Clark (2016) have shown that exposure
to misleading statistics about climate change—and many contrarian claims are judged
to be misleading and inaccurate in a blind expert test (Lewandowsky et al. 2016)—can
adversely impact people’s attitudes.
Perhaps even more concerning is the possibility that denial has also affected the
course of climate science itself, a proposal that was independently put forward by the
first author and colleagues under the label “seepage” (Lewandowsky et al. 2015b,d)
and by Biddle and Leuschner (2015) under the label “bad dissent.” Common to both
proposals is the idea that denial has impeded scientific progress, notwithstanding the
crucial role of normal dissent and debate in science:
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Dissent can be beneficial even if it is based on low quality research, as it can
provoke discussion and, thus, lead to a fuller understanding of the state of knowl-
edge. In order for dissent to be epistemically problematic, it must not only be
based on low quality research (or research that violates established conventional
standards), it must also impede scientific progress.
Unfortunately, dissent in some areas of science is increasingly doing just this;
more and more, it is being used by stakeholders to undermine the authority of
science in order to postpone inconvenient political action. In climate science,
contrarian studies are often disseminated through networks established by con-
servative think tanks and then used as a basis for both personal and professional
attacks on climate scientists. We have shown that there is strong empirical evi-
dence that the attacks have an influence on the work of these scientists and hence
on the progress of climate science (Biddle and Leuschner 2015, p. 276).
Thus, fromapurely pragmatic perspective,weknowof nodiscernible cost—in termsof
political effectiveness—of the conspiracist, incoherent, andmisleading aspects of con-
trarian discourse. As a political strategy, organized denial of climate science appears
to “work”—a judgment supported by the fact that written material arguing against
mainstream science conveys greater certainty, and hence may have greater persuasive
impact, than scientifically-founded material (Medimorec and Pennycook 2015).
2 Conclusion
There is considerable evidence that the rejection of (climate) science involves a com-
ponent of conspiracist discourse. In this article, we provided preliminary evidence
that the pseudo-scientific arguments that underpin climate science denial are mutually
incoherent, which is a known attribute of conspiracist ideation. The lack of mecha-
nisms to self-correct the scientific incoherencies manifest in denialist discourse further
evidences that this is not the level at which rational activity is focused, and we must
move to a higher level, looking at the role of conspiracist ideation in the political
realm. At that political level, climate denial achieves coherence in its uniform and
unifying opposition to GHG emission cuts. The coherent political stance of denial
may not be undercut by its scientific incoherence. Climate science denial is therefore
perhaps best understood as a rational activity that replaces a coherent body of science
with an incoherent and conspiracist body of pseudo-science for political reasons and
with considerable political coherence and effectiveness.
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